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Casenote
I Tolled You I Had More Time!:
The Future of Tolling Looks Bright
for Crime Victims, as the
Georgia Court of Appeals
Establishes New Meaning of
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99I. INTRODUCTION

Gone are the days of crime victims rushing to the courthouse steps to
beat the statute of limitations' ticking clock. Now, crime victims have the
ability to make time stand still in regard to their claims arising out of the
crime committed against them. Tolling statutes extend the time for plaintiffs to sue by temporarily suspending the running of the statute of limitations.1 One such statute, section 9-3-99 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 2 tolls the statute of limitations for claims brought
3
by plaintiffs who were the victim of a crime giving rise to their action.

* For your countless hours spent editing, for always taking the time to pull up a chair
and talk through every critique, praise, and suggestion, and for your contagious enthusiasm
for the law, thank you Professor Steve Johnson. This Casenote would not have been possible
without your guidance and support. To Professor Jeremy Kidd, thank you for offering a
fresh perspective into the implications of this case. Dad, Mom, Tiff, and Jimmy, I cannot
imagine this journey without you. Thank you for your unconditional love.
1. See Harrison v. McAfee, 338 Ga. App. 393, 394-95, 788 S.E.2d 872, 874 (2016).
2. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 (2007 & Supp. 2016).
3. Id.
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The statute was enacted in 2005 and was consistently interpreted only
to apply to lawsuits brought by crime victims against their perpetrators. 4
However, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in the 2016 case Harrison v.
McAfee, 5 relied on the statute's plain meaning and interpreted it in a new
way, applying it to lawsuits against persons other than perpetrators of
the crime as long as the claim arose out of the facts and circumstances of
the crime. 6 This drastically altered the scope of the statute, and overruled
the court's prior decisions.7 As the court recognized in its opinion, the
broader interpretation of the statute will significantly impact the future
of personal injury actions brought by crime victims. 8
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

John Harrison's attempt to bring a lawsuit against Dargan McAfee

and the Twisted Shamrock (Shamrock) met some difficulty when the trial
court rejected his argument that § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitations

for his personal injury claims. 9 Section 9-3-99 tolls the statute of limitations until the prosecution of the person who committed the crime against
the plaintiff terminates or finalizes, as long as the period does not exceed
six years. 10

What Harrison had probably assumed would be a pleasant night was
significantly altered when he was shot in the arm while patronizing the
Shamrock, a restaurant and bar located in Macon, Georgia. On the night
of June 16, 2011, a group of masked men burst into the Shamrock in an
apparent attempt to rob the bar. At least one of the men was armed. Harrison was shot in the arm as a result of the alleged robbery attempt. Unfortunately, as of July 7, 2016-the day the court filed its opinion on this
case-Harrison's shooter had yet to be found."
On August 14, 2013, Harrison filed a premises liability lawsuit against
McAfee, the owner and operator of the Shamrock at the time of the shooting. Harrison alleged that McAfee had been negligent in maintaining the
bar and that his negligence allowed the incident to take place. McAfee
raised the defense that Harrison's complaint was time-barred by the two-

&

4. See Ga. H.R. Bill 172, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 88 (amending O.C.G.A. ch. 9-3
(2007 & Supp. 2016), O.C.G.A. tit.. 17 (2013 & Supp. 2016), O.C.G.A. § 48-7-161 (2013
Supp. 2015)); see also Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 395-97, 788 S.E.2d at 874-75.
5. 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872 (2016).
6. Id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 878-79.
7. See id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 879.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 874.
10. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99.
11. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 393-94, 788 S.E.2d at 873.
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year statute of limitations for personal injury cases, set forth in O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-33,12 and filed a motion to dismiss on this ground. 13 However,
McAfee withdrew his motion to dismiss after Harrison amended his complaint to allege that the limitation period had been tolled under § 9-399.14 Relying on the fact that Harrison filed his complaint over two years
after the incident took place, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Harrison's claims were barred by the statute of
limitations for personal injury cases. 15 In response, Harrison argued that,
due to his status as the victim of a crime, his complaint was timely filed
under § 9-3-99. Harrison further argued the court's prior holdings that §
9-3-99 only applied to claims brought against alleged perpetrators were
erroneous. Despite his efforts, the trial court rejected Harrison's arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.1 6
On appeal, Harrison continued to argue the applicability of § 9-3-99 to
his case. 17 Again asserting the court's prior holdings surrounding § 9-399 were wrongly decided, he urged the court to overrule its precedent.
The Georgia Court of Appeals gave great consideration to its prior holdings in which it interpreted § 9-3-99 as being limited in scope only to
claims brought by victims against criminal defendants. After reviewing
the history of its decisions surrounding this issue and reexamining the
plain language of the statute, the court agreed with Harrison that its
prior interpretation of the statute was erroneous. 1 The court held that §
9-3-99 applied to Harrison's claims against McAfee and the Shamrock,
and the statute of limitations was successfully tolled. 19

12. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2007 & Supp. 2016).
13. McAfee raised two defenses in his answer. In addition to the defense that the claims
were time-barred, the other defense was that Harrison had failed to join Twisted Shamrock,
Inc. as a party in the lawsuit. Harrison,338 Ga. App. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873.
14. Id. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873-74. After filing his first amended complaint to include
that the statute of limitations had been tolled, Harrison filed a second amended complaint
in which he added Twisted Shamrock, Inc. as a party. Id.
15. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 ("Actions for injuries to the person shall be brought
within two years after the right of action accrues, except for injuries to the reputation,
which shall be brought within one year after the right of action accrues, and except for
actions for injuries to the person involving loss of consortium, which shall be brought within
four years after the right of action accrues.").
16. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 874.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 398-99, 788 S.E.2d at 876.
19. Id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 878-79.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. What Does O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99 Say?
Title nine, Chapter three of the O.C.G.A., entitled, "Limitations of Actions," lays out the statutes pertaining to the statute of limitations in
different tort actions. 20 Article five of this chapter is dedicated to the various tolling provisions in civil actions. Included in these provisions is § 93-99, which reads as follows:
The running of the period of limitations with respect to any cause of
action in tort that may be brought by the victim of an alleged crime
which arises out of the facts and circumstances relating to the commission of such alleged crime committed in this state shall be tolled from
the date of the commission of the alleged crime or the act giving rise
to such action in tort until the prosecution of such crime or act has
become final or otherwise terminated, provided that such time does
not exceed six years, except as otherwise provided in Code Section 93-33.1.21

B. Creationof O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-99

Section 9-3-99 was one of many statutes enacted as part of the Crime
Victims Restitution Act of 2005 (CVRA).22 This Act was introduced at a
time when there appeared to be frustration among prosecutors and victims' advocates in relation to the criminal justice system's treatment of
victims. 23 In response to the apparent frustration, former Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue introduced the CVRA, thus acknowledging the need
for reform within the criminal justice system concerning victims' rights
and remedies. 24 Regarding § 9-3-99, the preamble of the CVRA indicates
that it provides a way for crime victims to bring civil actions "against the
persons accused of such crimes." 25 Although this language is not written
into the body of the statute, courts have relied on it when discussing the

20. O.C.G.A. tit. 9, ch. 3 (2007 & Supp. 2016).
21. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99. In 2015, § 9-3-99 was amended. While no language was removed
or altered, the words "except as otherwise provided in Code Section 9-3-33.1" were added to
the end of the statute. Id. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33.1 concerns childhood sexual abuse and provides
its own set of requirements in regard to the statute of limitations in such cases. O.C.G.A. §
9-3-33.1 (2007 & Supp. 2016).
22. Ga. H.R. Bill 172, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 88.
23. See David McDade, The Courage to Fight for Justice; Crime Victims, Prosecutors
Benefit From Perdue Reforms, ATLANTA J. & CONST. (June 13, 2008).
24. See id.
25. Ga. H.R. Bill 172, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws at 88-89.
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legislative intent behind § 9-3-99.26 As a result, this language has played
an important role in guiding courts' decisions concerning the allegedly
2
ambiguous language of the statute. 27 That is, until Harrisonv. McAfee. 8

C. The Georgia Supreme Court and the PlainLanguage Discussion
Since the enactment of § 9-3-99, Georgia courts have been faced with
two questions regarding its scope. The first relates to the extent of crimes
covered by the statute. 29 The second concerns the kind of defendant
30
against whom the statute could be used to toll the limitations period.
The Georgia Supreme Court resolved the first question in the 2009 case,
Beneke v. Parker,31 in which it relied on the statute's plain language in
reaching its decision. 32 In doing so, the court interpreted the language in
33
question broadly so as not to intrude on its plain meaning.
In Beneke, the Georgia Supreme Court did not agree with the holding
of the court of appeals that only offenses that satisfy the definition of
"crime" as laid out in O.C.G.A. § 16-2-134 are applicable to § 9-3-99.35 According to § 16-2-1, in order to commit a crime, one must act with intent
or criminal negligence. 36 However, the court of appeals determined that
because some misdemeanors, such as traffic violations, do not have a
37
mens rea requirement, they are not covered by the tolling statute. Acknowledging this argument, the supreme court looked to the language in
O.C.G.A. § 16-1-3 for a definition of "misdemeanor."38 Pointing to the language stating a misdemeanor is "any crime other than a felony," the court

26. See Mays v. Target Corp., 322 Ga. App. 44, 46, 743 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2013).
27. See id.
28. See generally Harrison, 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872.
29. See Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733, 734, 684 S.E.2d 243, 244 (2009).
30. See, e.g., Valades v. Uslu, 301 Ga. App. 885, 889, 689 S.E.2d 338, 342 (2009).
31. 285 Ga. 733, 684 S.E.2d 243 (2009).
32. Id. at 735, 684 S.E.2d at 244.
33. See id. The supreme court's plain language reasoning and broad interpretation
would later be used to support the Georgia Court of Appeals plain language argument in
interpreting the statute as having a broad scope in regard to defendants.
34. O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1 (2011 & Supp. 2016).
35. Beneke, 285 Ga. at 734, 684 S.E.2d at 244.
36. O.C.G.A. § 16-2-1.
37. See Beneke v. Parker, 293 Ga. App. 186, 667 S.E.2d 97 (2008). The court of appeals
reasoned that violations of the Uniform Rules of the Road, such as "following too closely,"
do not constitute crimes because the State is not required to prove intent or criminal negligence to get a conviction. Id. at 188, 667 S.E.2d at 100.
38. Beneke, 285 Ga. at 734, 684 S.E.2d at 244.
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concluded that "crime," as mentioned in § 9-3-99, encompassed misdemeanors and felonies alike. 39 It reached its decision by concluding that,
had the Georgia General Assembly intended to limit the scope of § 9-3-99
to only serious crimes, it would have done so. 40
D. The Big Question: What Kind of Defendant Does This Statute Apply
To?
In the 2007 case DeKalb Medical Center, Inc. v. Hawkins,4 1 the Georgia Court of Appeals, for the first time, described § 9-3-99 as tolling the
statute of limitations only while the "prosecution of the defendant is
pending." 42 Though this was mentioned only in dicta in Hawkins, this
would soon become a widely discussed issue surrounding § 9-3-99.43 The
court of appeals quickly set the precedent that the statute only applied
to defendants who were somehow linked to the criminal activity giving
rise to the civil action. 44 However, in setting this precedent, the court was
inconsistent in the language it used to describe the specific kind of defendant and situation in which the tolling statute applied. 45
In Valades v. Uslu, 46 decided in 2009, the Georgia Court of Appeals,
Second Division, held that § 9-3-99 did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims

39. Id. Therefore, when considering whether § 9-3-99 is applicable, the supreme court
established that there need not be any discussion about whether there was intent or criminal negligence. Id.
40. Id. at 735, 684 S.E.2d at 244. This reasoning was later quoted by the Georgia Court
of Appeals to support its use of the plain language argument in interpreting language in
the statute regarding the type of defendants the statute of limitations could be tolled
against. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 879.
41. 288 Ga. App. 840, 655 S.E.2d 823 (2007).
42. Id. at 847, 655 S.E.2d at 828. DeKalb Medical Center (DMC) removed Tara Hawkins from life support without her mother's consent. More than two years after Tara's
death, her mother filed a lawsuit against DMC on behalf of her two-year-old grandson,
Emmanuel Hawkins (Tara's son). She argued that it was a wrongful death claim and that
the two-year statute of limitations for such claims was tolled because the plaintiff, Emmanuel, was a minor. DMC argued that general tolling provisions should never be applied in
wrongful death cases. In its reasoning against that argument, the court referenced many
general tolling provisions, including § 9-3-99. Id. Ultimately, the court held that the minority tolling provision applied in this case. Id.
43. See Harrison,338 Ga. App. at 395, 788 S.E.2d at 874; Orr v. River Edge Cmty. Serv.
Bd., 331 Ga. App. 228, 230, 770 S.E.2d 308, 310(2015); Mays, 322 Ga. App. at 46, 743 S.E.2d
at 605; Columbia Cty. v. Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 153, 695 S.E.2d 674, 678 (2010); Valades, 301 Ga. App. at 889, 689 S.E.2d at 342.
44. See Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 395, 778 S.E.2d at 874.
45. See id. at 401, 778 S.E.2d at 878 (discussing inconsistencies in its prior interpretations of the tolling statute as argument for not adhering to precedent).
46. 301 Ga. App. 885, 689 S.E.2d 338 (2009).
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47

In that case, a traffic

stop deteriorated into a heated argument between the Valadeses and
Uslu. The Valadeses alleged that during the argument, Uslu yelled at
them and was aggressive toward Mrs. Valades. 48 As a result, they filed a
complaint against Uslu for, among other things, false arrest, assault and
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 49 The court reasoned that because the civil defendant was not being prosecuted for any
crime surrounding the incident that led to the cause of action, the tolling
statute was not applicable.5 0 Although the court did not specifically identify any language in the statute suggesting a limitation, it held that § 93-99's scope was limited to claims against defendants who have been
prosecuted.5 1
The Georgia Court of Appeals looked to its Valades holding in reaching
its decision in the 2010 case, Columbia County v. Branton,52 in which it
was confronted with the same issue of whether § 9-3-99 applied to claims
brought against a particular defendant. 53 Though similar, its holding in
Branton identified the statute as applying only to criminal defendantslanguage that is different than that used in Valades. 54
In Branton, the plaintiffs wife, Margaret Branton, was the passenger
in a vehicle that was struck by Tiara Smith, a shoplifter, fleeing from the
scene of her crime. Margaret Branton was killed in the collision. Whether
Columbia County Sheriffs Deputy Kenny Curtis was in pursuit of Smith
at the time of the collision remained an unresolved question after the
incident. At first, there seemed to be a consensus that he had not been in
pursuit. However, as time went by, new evidence suggested he had been

47. Id. at 889, 689 S.E.2d at 342.
48. Id. at 886-88, 689 S.E.2d at 340. The argument arose as a result of Officer George
Hodge placing the Valadeses' son-in-law in custody for driving without a license and for his
status as an illegal immigrant. Id.
49. Id. at 889, 689 S.E.2d at 342. The complaint included Fulton County as a defendant. However, the trial court granted summary judgment to the County on the basis of
sovereign immunity. The trial court also granted summary judgment to Uslu in his official
capacity, but denied summary judgment on the claims against him in his individual capacity. Id. at 885-86, 689 S.E.2d at 340.
50. Id. at 889, 689 S.E.2d at 342.

51. See id.
52. 304 Ga. App. 149, 695 S.E.2d 674 (2010).
53. Id. at 152-53, 695 S.E.2d at 677-78.
54. Id. The court reasoned that because the county defendants did not share in criminal
responsibility for the incident giving rise to the civil action, they were not "criminal defendants" as required by § 9-3-99. Id.; see Vajades, 301 Ga. App. at 889, 689 S.E.2d at 342 (holding that § 9-3-99 only applies to claims against defendants being prosecuted).
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in pursuit and that Smith was attempting to elude him when the collision
took place.55
In response to the increasing evidence, Branton filed suit outside the
statute of limitations period against Columbia County and its sheriff for
negligence in the alleged high-speed chase.56 Branton argued that, due to
57
his status as a crime victim, § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitations.
55
However, the court held that it did not. Following Valades, the court
emphasized that the county defendants were not being prosecuted for
any crime related to the incident.5 9 The court took this reasoning further
and explained that, although the county defendants and Smith may be
joint tortfeasors, because the county defendants did not share in criminal
responsibility with Smith for Margaret Branton's unfortunate death,
their actions did not arise "out of the facts and circumstances" of the incident.60 Despite directly contradicting its interpretation of "arising out
of' in other cases, where the court read the phrase as meaning, "flowed
from," or "almost any causal connection or relationship," the court established that "aris[ing] out of' in § 9-3-99 is directly linked to criminal responsibility, and that civil responsibility is not sufficient. 61
The alleged ambiguity of § 9-3-99's language was first pointed out in
the 2013 case, Mays v. Target Corp.62 There, the Georgia Court of Appeals
relied on its decisions in previous cases when it held that the statute of
limitations was not tolled in Mays' action against Target Corporation
(Target). 63 However, just as the language used in Branton varied slightly
from that in Valades, so too did the language in Mays distinguish itself
from both prior holdings. 64 In Mays, the court held that § 9-3-99 applied

55. Branton, 304 Ga. App. at 150, 695 S.E.2d at 676.
56. Id. at 151, 695 S.E.2d at 676-77.
57. See id. at 152, 695 S.E.2d at 677.
58. Id. at 153, 695 S.E.2d at 678.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 152-53, 695 S.E.2d at 678.
61. See id.; BBL-McCarthy, LLC v. Baldwin Paving Co., 285 Ga. App. 494, 498, 646
S.E.2d 682, 686 (2007).
62. 322 Ga. App. 44, 46, 743 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2013).
63. Id.
64. Compare Branton, 304 Ga. App. at 153, 695 S.E.2d at 678 (holding that § 9-3-99
applies as to claims brought against criminal defendants), and Valades, 301 Ga. App. at
889, 689 S.E.2d at 342 (holding that § 9-3-99 applies as to claims brought against defendants being prosecuted for the crime giving rise to the cause of action), with Mays, 322 Ga.
App. at 46, 743 S.E.2d at 605 (holding that § 9-3-99 applies as to claims brought against
defendants accused of the crime giving rise to the cause of action).
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to defendants who had been accused of the crime leading to the cause of
action. 65
Mays alleged that a male Target employee had taken her picture while
she was changing in the unisex Target dressing room. Over two years
after the alleged offense, Mays attempted to bring a cause of action
against Target, arguing § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitations.66 The
court held that because Target was not accused of any crime arising out
of the incident, § 9-3-99 did not apply.67 Mays argued such a decision
went against the plain language of § 9-3-99, which does not limit its application to lawsuits brought against perpetrators of crimes.68 Recognizing the tolling statute's unclear language, the court looked to the preamble of the CVRA in an effort to unravel its ambiguity by finding evidence
of legislative intent.6 9 Noting the preamble's inclusion of the language,
"against the person accused of such crimes," the court concluded that the
purpose of enacting § 9-3-99 was to provide victims with a greater opportunity to recover from their perpetrator specifically. 70
Although the court of appeals ultimately held that § 9-3-99 did not
apply in Mays' case, it cited language from the trial court's order which
acknowledged the persuasive argument that could be made in favor of
applying

§ 9-3-99.71 The trial court's order contrasted Mays to Branton,

stating that it would be difficult to argue the claims against Target did
not "arise out of the facts and circumstances" surrounding the employee's
commission of the alleged crime. 72 The trial court's order explains that
by Target hiring this employee, providing dressing rooms, and then giving its employees access to the dressing rooms, it could be argued that
Target was involved in the criminal behavior. 73 The trial court's order
even stated that had the court of appeals not made prior decisions concerning the scope of § 9-3-99, it may have decided differently.74 Although
this was simply a mention of a potential argument (that would fail), that
the trial court believed the argument persuasive and possible, had it not

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
2012).
74.

Mays, 322 Ga. App. at 46, 743 S.E.2d at 605.
Id. at 44-45, 743 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 46, 743 S.E.2d at 605.
Id. at 45, 743 S.E.2d at 604-05.
Id. at 46, 743 S.E.2d at 605.
See id.
Id. at 45, 743 S.E.2d at 604.
Id.
Order, Mays v. Target Corp., No. 11SC-1484, at *4-5 (Forsyth Cty. St. Ct. Apr. 25,
See id. at *3.

566

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

been for precedent set by the higher court, is important, as it acknowledged the broader meaning of the "arising out of"language that would be
75
critical in the court of appeals reasoning and decision in Harrison.
Without further analyzing the statute, in 2015, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that because neither of the defendants in Orr v. River Edge
Community Service Board7 6 were criminal co-defendants who shared in
criminal responsibility for the crime relating to the cause of action, § 977
3-99 could not be used to toll the statute of limitations. There, the plainwas driven by a
that
tiff's husband had been struck and killed by a van
River Edge Community Service Board (River Edge) employee. The plaintiff filed suit against River Edge and the Department of Behavioral
Health and Developmental Disabilities after the statutory period
78
elapsed, arguing § 9-3-99's applicability to her case. Her argument
79
failed. Further supporting its reasoning against allowing the tolling
statute to apply, the court noted that the defendants' acts did not lead to
80
a criminal prosecution, nor were either of them charged with any crime.
The court borrowed language from the holdings in Valades and Branton,
affirming that the standard in applying § 9-3-99 had become whether the
civil defendant could, in some way, be criminally linked to the conduct
giving rise to the action in tort. 81 However, whether the requirement for
applying the statute was criminal prosecution, being charged with a
crime, or being criminally responsible, was not made clear by the court's
82
mention of all these standards in the Orr opinion. What was clear, however, was that if the defendant was purely civil and not at all related to
83
the criminal activity, courts refused to apply the tolling statute.
IV. CouRT's RATIONALE

In Harrisonv. McAfee, the Georgia Court of Appeals was again faced
with a plaintiff wishing to use § 9-3-99 to toll the statute of limitations

75. See Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 398-99,788 S.E.2d at 876.
76. 331 Ga. App. 228, 770 S.E.2d 308 (2015).
77. Id. at 230-31, 770 S.E.2d at 310-11.
78. See id. at 229, 770 S.E.2d at 310.
79. Id. at 231, 770 S.E.2d at 311.
80. Id. at 230-31, 770 S.E.2d at 310-11.
81. Id. at 231, 770 S.E.2d at 310; see Branton, 304 Ga. App. at 153, 695 S.E.2d at 678
(holding that § 9-3-99 applies as to claims brought against criminal defendants); Valades,
301 Ga. App. at 889, 689 S.E.2d at 342 (holding that § 9-3-99 applies as to claims brought
against defendants being prosecuted for the crime giving rise to the cause of action).
82. See Orr, 331 Ga. App. at 230, 770 S.E.2d at 310.
83. See id. at 230-31, 770 S.E.2d at 310-11.
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for his claim against non-criminal defendants. 84 However, rather than
citing to precedent against such an application of the statute and calling
it a day, the court reexamined the statute's language and held that its
prior interpretation of the statute was erroneous.8 5
With Judge Peterson authoring the opinion,86 the court reversed the
trial court's order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the
ground that the court's prior decisions had misinterpreted § 9-3-99.87 In
doing so, the court overruled its prior decisions pertaining to § 9-3-99's
applicability to civil actions brought by the victim of a crime against noncriminal defendants.88
In reaching its decision, the court first analyzed its treatment of § 9-399 in prior cases.89 The court recounted how it treated the question of
whether the tolling statute could be broadly applied to cover claims
brought against non-criminal defendants.9 0 The court noted that it first
addressed this issue in DeKalb Medical Center, Inc. v. Hawkins, but
acknowledged that its reference to the issue in that case was purely
dicta. 91 From there, the court described how the dicta in Hawkins evolved
into holdings in future decisions, 92 and went on to note the inconsistencies and errors in those holdings. 93
Noting § 9-3-99's alleged ambiguity, the court acknowledged that, in
previous decisions, it had relied on the language in the CVRA's preamble
as evidence of the legislative intent behind the statute. 94 The court explained that where it finds statutory language to be ambiguous, it takes

84. See Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 874. From this point on, for the
purposes of this Casenote, defendants meeting any one of the requirements as given in
Valades, Branton, or Mays for the tolling statute to apply will broadly be referred to as
"criminal defendants," and those not meeting any of those requirements, such as the defendants in Harrison, will be referred to as "non-criminal defendants."
85. See generally id.
86. "Andrews, P. J., Barnes, P. J., Phipps, P. J., Dillard, McFadden, Boggs, Ray,
Branch, McMillian, Rickman and Mercier, JJ., concur. Miller, P. J., and Ellington, P. J.,
concur in judgment only. Doyle, C. J., not participating." Id. at 393, 403, 788 S.E.2d at 873,
879.
87. Id. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 395, 788 S.E.2d at 874.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 395-96, 788 S.E.2d at 874.
92. Id. at 396-97, 788 S.E.2d at 874-75.
93. Id. at 401, 788 S.E.2d at 878.
94. Id. at 399, 788 S.E.2d at 877. The court referred to its discussion in Mays in which
it explained that the caption of the act is not a part of the act, and that therefore, it cannot
control over the plain meaning of the statute itself. Id.
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95
the title or caption of the Georgia General Assembly's act into account.
However, the court in Harrisondid not believe the statute to be ambiguous, and therefore did not take the language in the CVRA into consider97
ation.96 Instead, the court reexamined the plain language of the statute.
In doing so, it reached the conclusion that its interpretation of the statute
prior to the case at bar had been incorrect.9 8 The court first discussed the
language of the statute which states that tolling is provided as to "any
cause of action in tort." 99 The analysis of this part of the statute focused
specifically on the word "any."100 The court used the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary definition of the word, and concluded that the statute
applies as it is literally stated: to "any" cause of action, without limitation, as long as the other provisions of the statute are met.101
Next, the court examined language it had addressed in earlier cases
such as Valades v. Uslu, Mays v. Target Corp., and Columbia County v.
Branton.102 The phrase in question was "arising out of."103 The statute
provides that the statute of limitations is tolled when the victim of a
crime brings any cause of action in tort that arises out of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the alleged crime. 104 Although the court addressed this language as applied to this statute in earlier cases, it instead
analyzed and relied on its interpretation of this language in cases not
concerning § 9-3-99.105 In those cases, the court construed the language

95. Id.
96. Id. The CVRA's preamble states that one of the purposes of the Act is to amend
Article 5 of Chapter 3 of Title 9 of the O.C.G.A., which relates "to tolling of limitations in
civil cases, so as to provide for a statute of repose in certain tort actions brought by victims
of crimes against the persons accused of such crimes." Ga. H.R. Bill 172, Reg. Sess., 2005
Ga. Laws at 88-89.
97. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 397, 788 S.E.2d at 875.
98. Id. at 400, 788 S.E.2d at 877.
99. Id. at 398, 788 S.E.2d at 876.
100. Id.
101. Id. The word, "any," as defined by Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary refers to
"one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind," "one, some, or all indiscriminately of whatever quantity," and "unmeasured or unlimited in amount, number, or extent." WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 93 (9th ed. 1991).

102. See Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 396-97, 788 S.E.2d at 874-75.
103. Id. at 398, 788 S.E.2d at 876.
104. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99.
105. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 398, 788 S.E.2d at 876; see Cont'l Cas. Co. v. H.S.I. Fin.
Serv., 266 Ga. 260, 466 S.E.2d 4 (1996) (discussing the "but for" analysis in determining
whether insurance claims arise out of particular conduct); City of College Park v. Ga. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency, 313 Ga. App. 239, 721 S.E.2d 97 (2011) (same); see also Sturgess v. OA Logistics Servs., 336 Ga. App. 134, 784 S.E.2d 432 (2016) (discussing the "but
for" analysis in terms of workplace injuries for purposes of workers' compensation law);
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to mean "grew out of," or "flowed from."106 Further, the court noted that
it had also held that "arise out of' does not always mean there is a proximate, or legal, cause connecting the conduct and injury, and almost any
causal connection would suffice. 107
Applying the presumption "that the General Assembly meant what it
said and said what it meant,"10 8 the court concluded that the statute is
not limited strictly to causes of action brought by the victim against a
criminal defendant. 109 Consequently, every case the court decided leading up to Harrison related to this particular issue had been wrongly decided.1 10 Applying its new interpretation of "arising out of," the court held
that Harrison's cause of action against McAfee arose out of the facts and
circumstances surrounding his injury that occurred at the Twisted
Shamrock as McAfee owned the establishment where the incident took
place that led to Harrison's injuries. 11 Earlier in its opinion, the court
mentioned the nonexistence of language in § 9-3-99 that limits its scope
to criminal defendants.1 12 With the new perspective in regard to the plain
meaning of this statute, the court held that the omission of this language
means that a limitation on the scope of the statute was not intended. 113
However, the court was not able to end its discussion after establishing
its new interpretation of the statute. 114 Because precedent had been set,
the court moved into a discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis to determine whether to overrule its prior decisions. 15

BBL-McCarthy, 285 Ga. App. 494, 646 S.E.2d 682 (discussing previous interpretations of
"arising out of').
106. Harrison,338 Ga. App. at 398, 788 S.E.2d at 876 (quoting BBL-McCarthy, 285 Ga.
App. at 498, 646 S.E.2d at 686).
107. Id. The court also briefly discussed its previous application of the "but for" analysis
in determining whether a particular result "arises out of' a particular set of circumstances.
Id.; see Cont? Cas., 266 Ga. 260, 466 S.E.2d 4; Interlocal, 313 Ga. App. 239, 721 S.E.2d 97;
Sturgess, 336 Ga. App. 134, 784 S.E.2d 432.
108. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 397, 788 S.E.2d at 875 (quoting Deal v. Coleman, 294
Ga. 170, 172, 751 S.E.2d 337, 341 (2013)).
109. Id. at 399, 788 S.E.2d at 876.
110. See id. at 400, 788 S.E.2d at 877.
111. See id. at 398, 788 S.E.2d at 876.
112. Id. at 398-99, 788 S.E.2d at 876.
113. Id. at 399, 788 S.E.2d at 876. The court listed examples of statutes enacted by the
Georgia General Assembly in which the scope was limited to a particular type of civil defendant. Id. In doing so, the court demonstrated that the General Assembly is capable of
including such language in its statutes, and that when it wishes to, it does. Id.
114. See id. at 400, 788 S.E.2d at 877.
115. Id.; cf. John K. Larkins, Jr., When Wrong is Right: Stare Decisis in the Supreme
Court of Georgia, 21 GA. B.J. 11, 15 (2015) ("The fundamental purpose of stare decisis is to
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When considering stare decisis, there are four factors that come into
play: (1) the age of the precedent; (2) reliance interests; (3) the workability of the decision; and (4) the soundness of its reasoning.1 16 The court
proceeded to analyze all of them in terms of this case.117
First, the court considered the age of the precedent.118 Whether § 9-399 applied to claims against non-criminal defendants was first explicitly
decided in Valades in 2009, less than seven years before the decision in
9 The court gave examples of erroneous statutory interpretaHarrison.11
tions that had been set as precedent far longer than seven years that both
it and the Georgia Supreme Court overruled.1 20 Using its own and the
supreme court's history as guidance, the court reasoned that the young
age of the precedent here was not a significant factor weighing in favor
of following its prior holdings.1 21
Next, the court explained that its prior interpretation of § 9-3-99 did
not create any reliance interests that would suggest heavily against overruling precedent.1 22 The court discussed that its prior decisions were inconsistent as to whether the statute is limited to claims against only
those who are accused of committing a crime, or to those who have actually been prosecuted.123 Therefore, due to the inconsistency, there is not
truly precedent on which to rely.1 24
Third, the court considered the workability of the statute. 125 It reasoned that the lack of clarity in its previous decisions, regarding whether
the statute applied only to prosecuted defendants or to those accused of
committing a crime, created workability issues. 126
The last factor considered in the stare decisis analysis is the soundness
of the reasoning.1 27 After examining the plain language of the statute and

promote the uniformity and stability of judicial decisions .... Ironically, the factors analysis
itself brings a level of stability and uniformity to the evaluation of stare decisis.").
116. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 401, 788 S.E.2d at 878.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see, e.g., Woodard v. State, 296 Ga. 803, 771 S.E.2d 362 (2015) (overruling a
twenty-four-year-old interpretation of a justification defense statute).
121. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 401, 788 S.E.2d at 878.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court also discussed that its prior interpretation of§ 9-3-99 did not establish
any substantive rights, nor did it affect property, contracts, or anything that would create
reliance on its continued erroneous interpretation. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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interpreting it as meaning that the statute applies to all claims brought
by crime victims, regardless of whether the defendant is criminal or noncriminal, the court stated that its prior reasoning on the question of the
statute's scope, in which it did not consider the plain language, had been
unsound.128

After moving through the four-factor analysis, the court concluded
that there is not a strong argument to be made in favor of reaffirming its
prior decisions. 129 The only argument in favor of following precedent, the
court stated, is that the case law was involved in interpretation of a stat130
The
ute as opposed to interpretation of a constitutional requirement.
a
correct
easily
can
Assembly
court explained that since the General
uphold
will
generally
courts
court's erroneous statutory interpretation,
precedent interpreting statutes and leave it for the Legislature to cor132
rect. 131 Correcting an erroneous constitutional ruling is not as simple.
After an erroneous statutory interpretation has been made, courts often
view legislative inaction as agreement with the interpretation. 133 However, the court in Harrison emphasized that such inaction is often the
result of unawareness or preoccupation, and that "it can be perilous to
rely heavily on legislative silence .

.

. to conclude that a court's interpre-

tation of a statute is correct." 134 Consequently, it concluded that stare
decisis and legislative inaction was not enough reason to justify continu135
ing to follow an erroneous interpretation of the statute.
As a result of deciding to break from precedent and make a new ruling
as to the proper interpretation and plain meaning of the statute, the
court held that the statute of limitations was tolled as to Harrison's cause
of action against the non-criminal defendants, McAfee and the Twisted
Shamrock.13 6 Further, Valades, Branton, Mays, and Orr v. River Edge

128. See id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 401-02, 788 S.E.2d at 878.
134. Id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 878 (quoting State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 659 n.8, 697
S.E.2d 757, 766 n.8 (2010)). Interestingly, Georgia courts have not always had the ability
to overrule prior decisions in the face of legislative silence. In 1858, a legislative act prohibited overruling any Georgia Supreme Court decision as its decisions were considered to be
the law unless and until changed by legislative enactment. Polly J. Price, Precedent and
JudicialPower After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 101 (2000).
135. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 878.
136. See id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 878-79.
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Community Service Board were overruled. 137 The court concluded by acknowledging the "significant impact" that its holding will have on future
personal injury cases brought by crime victims. 138
V. IMPLICATIONS

Although the history of § 9-3-99 is not highly extensive, much discussion has taken place surrounding its language, and many people have
been impacted by the conversation-favorably for some, and unfavorably
for others. 139 With such a drastic new interpretation, we can anticipate
that many people will continue to be impacted by the statute, but not in
quite the same way.
The new interpretation of § 9-3-99 allows for its broad application to
claims brought against all civil defendants, regardless of their status as
criminal defendants for the conduct giving rise to the action. 140 This
could, potentially, be especially important in situations similar to Harrison v. McAfee, where the perpetrator is never found, and therefore never
prosecuted. 14 1 When the victim does not have the opportunity to recover,
or even see some form of justice for the way in which they were wronged,
this new broad application of the statute allows them to seek justice in
another way, from another source. There is extra time for them to choose
to file suit, and there is more time for someone to put the "bug in their
ear" that they should file suit. 142

137. Id. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 879. In addition, the court noted its disapproval of the
dicta in Hawkins. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally Harrison, 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872; Orr, 331 Ga. App. 228,
770 S.E.2d 308; Mays, 322 Ga. App. 44, 743 S.E.2d 603; Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 695
S.E.2d 674; Valades, 301 Ga. App. 885, 689 S.E.2d 338.
140. Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at 402, 788 S.E.2d at 878-79.
141. Id. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873.
142. See, e.g., Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 695 S.E.2d 674. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit
against the county defendants after learning of increasing evidence that there was a highspeed chase. Id. at 150-51, 695 S.E.2d 676-77. Although it could never be known for sure,
this is an example of a plaintiff who may not have brought a lawsuit against the county
defendants but for the accrual of evidence over time, and his knowledge thereof. Though,
in Branton, the plaintiff was not able to use § 9-3-99 to toll the statute of limitations, the
decision in Harrisoncould now potentially make it possible. See Harrison, 338 Ga. App. at
402, 788 S.E.2d at 878-79. If the plaintiff in Branton would not have brought the lawsuit
had it not been for the evidence he learned of over time, this case illustrates the significant
impact that increased time to bring a claim-through the ability to toll the statute of limitations-has on potential litigation. See Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 695 S.E.2d 674.
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Within three months after the decision in Harrison, three opinions
cited to its holding.143 Interestingly, since its enactment in 2005, § 9-3-99
had only been cited in twenty-three separate cases up until, and including, Harrison.144In some of those cases, the tolling statute was not even
5
argued, but was mentioned as dicta or in a footnote.14 Section 9-3-99 was
not the most popular of statutes, with a track record of being mentioned
only two or three times a year. However, the sudden peak since Harrison
suggests that plaintiffs may start to use § 9-3-99 more frequently. The
prolonged potential for litigation in civil cases stemming from criminal
acts to a broader range of defendants could mean that Georgia courts are
going to start seeing these cases on a far more regular basis than was
previously the trend.
The potential increase in plaintiffs taking advantage of the tolling
statute means that Georgia courts may be confronted with questions that
they have not yet had to address in regard to § 9-3-99. One such question
has already appeared in Benjamin v. Thomas,1 46 where the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia had to decide whether
§ 9-3-99 applied during the pendency of an investigation that does not
ultimately result in criminal charges.1 47 This question had never been

143. See Forbes v. Smith, 338 Ga. App. 546, 790 S.E.2d 550 (2016); see also Benjamin v.
Thomas, No. 1:16-cv-1632-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132575 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2016);
Harris v. City of Albany, No. 1:15-CV-034 (LJA), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131995 (M.D. Ga.
Sept. 27, 2016).
144. See Bridgewater v. DeKalb Cty., 430 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2011); Salas v. Pierce,
297 F. App'x 874 (11th Cir. 2008); Reynolds v. Murray, 170 F. App'x 49 (11th Cir. 2006);
Sims v. Evans, No. 5:15-CV-285 (CAR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166707 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 14,
2015); Ash v. Douglas Cty., No. 1:14-CV-1440-ELR-LTW, slip op. (N.D. Ga. July 31, 2015);
Royal v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 6:10-cv-104, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8653 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 26,
2015); Kendall v. Sutherland, No. 1:13-CV-04263-RWS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157191
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2014); Dean v. Douglas, No. 5:12-CV-120 (CAR), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
175006 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2012); Seals v. Montgomery, No. 7:08-CV-80-HL, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49178 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2010); Hicks v. City of Savannah, No. CV408-006, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 113472 (S.D. Ga. June 16, 2008); Stegeman v. Georgia, No. 1:06-cv-2954-WSD,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51126 (N.D. Ga. July 16, 2007); Beneke, 285 Ga. 733, 684 S.E.2d 243;
Harrison,338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872; Orr, 331 Ga. App. 228, 770 S.E.2d 308; Mays,
322 Ga. App. 44, 743 S.E.2d 603; Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 695 S.E.2d 674; Smith v.
Chemtura Corp., 297 Ga. App. 287, 676 S.E.2d 756 (2009); Valades, 301 Ga. App. 885, 689
S.E.2d 338; Hawkins, 288 Ga. App. 840, 655 S.E.2d 823; McGhee v. Jones, 287 Ga. App.
345, 652 S.E.2d 163 (2007); Canas v. Al-Jabi, 282 Ga. App. 764, 639 S.E.2d 494 (2006);
Gilliam v. Adams, 2013 Ga. State LEXIS 120 (Fulton Cty. State Ct. Nov. 4, 2013); Sleep v.
Doe, 2011 Ga. Super. LEXIS 52 (Fulton Cty. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2011).
145. See, e.g., Salas, 297 F. App'x 874.
146. No. 1:16-cv-1632-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132575 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2016).
147. Id. at *16.
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addressed until this case. 148 Using Harrison as guidance, the court predicted that if the case were before the Georgia Supreme Court, it would
hold that in such a situation, § 9-3-99 would toll the victim's causes of
action.149 This decision does more than provide, for the first time, an answer to this specific question regarding the tolling statute. Rather, it foreshadows that courts will likely play Follow-the-Leader with Harrisonand
answer questions arising around § 9-3-99's application using as broad an
interpretation as the plain language will allow.
Although allowing a plaintiff to bring suit against non-criminal defendants does not mean the plaintiff will ultimately prevail in their overall claim, operating all that extra time with uncertainty could be damaging in itself to the defendant. The Harrisondecision brings into question
the policy behind tolling statutes as a whole. As seen in this case, the new
reading of the statute now allows for one victim to toll the statute of limitations to bring suit against another victim. 150 Although the court in
Harrisonchose to ignore it, evidence of legislative intent appears in the
CVRA's preamble and does not read as if it supports victim on victim
tolling as the purpose behind the CVRA is to protect all victims. 15 1 This
victim on victim application has the potential to seriously impact defendants, particularly businesses similar to Shamrock. Today, because of
Harrison, it is possible that when a private business is the scene of a
crime, the business and its owner will now be subject to suit for a longer
period of time. This potentially prolonged state of uncertainty, of wondering whether they will be sued, could create problems for the business
down the road. If the owner decided to sell, as they often do when tragedy
strikes, the party looking to purchase will be hesitant, and most likely
choose not to go through with the purchase, knowing that if they do, they
could be subject to suit longer than the statutory period. Further, where
the owner, or even a non-business owning defendant, may want to pay
the plaintiffs medical bills or resolve the issue before it develops into a
148. See id. at *16-18.
149. Id. at *17-18.
150. See Harrison, 338 Ga. App. 393, 788 S.E.2d 872. In Harrison, the defendants,
McAfee and the Twisted Shamrock, were victims of the alleged robbery attempt that ultimately led to Harrison's injuries. Id. at 394, 788 S.E.2d at 873.
151. See Ga. H.R. Bill 172, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 88-89. The Act was created, in
part:
[T]o substantially revise the laws of this state relating to the conduct of criminal
trials and the impact of the criminal justice system on victims of crime; to amend
Article 5 of Chapter 3 of Title 9 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to tolling of limitations in civil cases, so as to provide for a statute of repose
in certain tort actions brought by victims of crimes against the persons accused
of such crimes.
Id.

2017]

O.C.G.A. § 9-3-99

575

lawsuit, they could potentially be left dangling in a state of uncertainty
for years. 152 The added stress that these defendants may endure could be
significant. So, was this truly the Georgia General Assembly's intent?
Perhaps some light will be shed on this question as more cases come
through.
GRETCHEN 0. CONNICK

152. There are many kinds of defendants, apart from business owners, who could potentially be severely impacted by this ruling. Police officers are often put into situations where
their actions are inter-mixed with the criminal activity that results in injuries to innocent
people. See, e.g., Branton, 304 Ga. App. 149, 695 S.E.2d 674. When the court in Harrison
overruled Branton, it confirmed the possibility that police officers could now be subject to
suit longer than the statutory period for conduct that took place in the scope of their employment. With the amount of time police officers spend around criminal activity, it will be
interesting to see how this ruling impacts them in their line of work. Additionally, when
the court overruled Mays, it confirmed that employers need now be wary of their employees'
conduct, as it could potentially subject them to suit for a period up to six years. Though this
does not mean the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, there are a significant number of people
who will now carry the stress of a potential lawsuit for years longer than was originally the
case, which is damage in itself. Furthermore, the costs they may incur as a result of being
sued could create financial harm, not just to businesses and employers, but to individuals.
It will be interesting to see if the Georgia General Assembly will step in and correct this
possibly erroneous new interpretation. However, there is also the possibility the General
Assembly will support the decision, thus affirming the court of appeals decision. Only time
will tell.
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